Russia's War on Ukraine

with Lt. Col. (ret) Alexander Vindman

Former Director for European Affairs for the U.S. National Security Council

In February of 2022, Russia ignited the largest conventional war in Europe since World War II

and have seen the war featuring a startling combination of grueling World War I-style trench

warfare and unprecedented use of modern drones and missiles. Ukrainian grit and innovation,

supported by extensive military aid from the United States and NATO, prevented a Russian

victory but locked the country in a brutal contest of attrition. Questions about the causes of the war and how it can end are perhaps the most important foreign policy challenges of the new U.S. administration. Alex Vindman, a regional expert at the heart of U.S. strategy, provided his thoughts on Russia’s war on Ukraine, the American foreign policy, and its role in what he calls a "preventable tragedy."

Policy Miscalculations Post-Cold War

According to Vindman, American policymakers had treated Ukraine as a peripheral issue rather than a cornerstone of Eastern European security. “Ukraine was seen as an appendage,” he said, one more domino in a collapsing Soviet system rather than a nation with its own democratic aspirations and strategic value.

This mischaracterization, he argues, led to years of policy miscalculations, particularly when the U.S. failed to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and anti-corruption efforts early on. While many in the West assumed Russia would gradually liberalize after the Cold War, Vindman insists that was always a dangerous illusion. “We bought into Russia’s version of itself, one filled with grandeur and privilege, rather than the reality of its imperial instincts,” Vindman said.

The Fallout of George H. W. Bush’s “Chicken Kyiv” Speech

Vindman pointed to former President George H. W. Bush’s 1991 speech in Kyiv, known as the

“Chicken Kyiv” speech by critics, as a pivotal example of misjudgment. Delivered just months

before Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for independence, Bush cautioned against “suicidal

nationalism.” Rather than embracing the Ukrainian push for sovereignty, the speech was widely interpreted as a snub to their determination.

“90% of Ukrainians wanted to start their own country,” Vindman said. “Instead of encouraging

that, we were too cautious, too worried about offending Russia.”

He adds that this failure of early moral and strategic support echoed throughout the 1990s,

particularly when it came to Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. While Ukraine gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal under U.S. pressure, promised security against adversaries never materialized when Russia broke its word.

A Pattern Ignored

Vindman’s critique does not stop at the 1990s, he sees a clear pattern of aggression from Russia that Western governments continually failed to confront, starting with the 2008 war in Georgia and continuing with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. “We should’ve seen the pattern by then,” Vindman said. “Georgia was a red flag. Crimea should’ve confirmed it.”

Instead, Vindman claims, the West issued mild sanctions and quickly moved on. This apathetic

response only emboldened the Kremlin, which interpreted Western hesitation as weakness. The underlying mistake was misjudging the Russian state as reactive rather than proactive. “Russia is not just a place; it is a policy,” Vindman noted, “A strategic one rooted in restoring lost influence.”

Trump and the Danger of Apathy

In perhaps his most pointed remarks, Vindman turned to the Trump administration’s approach to Russia and Ukraine. He characterized former President Donald Trump as “transactional,” saying that Trump lacked both historical understanding and long-term vision. He recounted the infamous event in which Trump allegedly pressured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to follow his orders, an act Vindman described as “strong-arming an ally under siege.”

“This was not policy,” Vindman said. “It was corruption, plain and simple. And it made us look

unreliable on the world stage.” He further criticized Trump’s admiration for strongmen and his

administration’s chaotic messaging on foreign policy. “We had no consistency toward Russia,”

he said. “That’s not just a political liability; it’s a national security threat.”

President Biden’s Response

While Vindman acknowledges that the Biden administration provided stronger support to

Ukraine, he argues that the damage had already been done. “We’re now reacting to a fire we

ignored for too long,” he said, citing weak push-back in the past and the slow pace of aid in the early days of the 2022 invasion. He emphasized that Russia’s strategic goals haven’t changed since the Soviet collapse, and that the U.S. must finally accept that fact.

What’s Next: A Realist’s Roadmap

Vindman’s ultimate argument is one of moderate clarity: the U.S. must craft foreign policy based not on hopes or personal connections, but on realism and strategic interest. That means recognizing the importance of states like Ukraine not only as partners but as keystones of regional order. It also means preparing for a world where “authoritarian actors will exploit Western complacency”. “We have economic values that support our national security,” Vindman said. “But we’ve allowed complacency and inequality to rot the foundation. In his view, America must pair its ideals with a tangible strategy before it's too late again.